

d'introduction, il n'y a aucun doute que St-Arnaud accomplira ses objectifs de départ. La qualité et la quantité de ses productions antérieures constituent un gage additionnel de sécurité à cet égard.

Bien qu'il soit accessible à tout lecteur intéressé à se former une vue d'ensemble de la psychologie humaniste, ce volume pourra particulièrement servir de cadre de référence théorique à tous les professionnels de la relation d'aide dont les interventions ont une visée hygiologique. Par ailleurs, l'envergure et l'excellence de cet ouvrage nous amène à suggérer à l'auteur de penser sérieusement à rendre disponible en d'autres langues, notamment en anglais.

Royce, J.R. & L.P. Mos (Eds.). *Humanistic Psychology: Concepts and Criticisms*. New York: Plenum Press, 1981.

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Most of the readers of this journal will recognize that Carl Rogers organized his influential ideas around one fundamental principle: that each and every human being is characterized by a tendency toward self-actualization. This hypothesis did not originate with Rogers but it has given his work a great spirit and has accorded him the status of one of a truly great spokesman for humanistic psychology.

One reason why readers of this journal may find *Humanistic Psychology: Concepts and Criticisms* of interest is that the essays contained in this volume are intended to provide a critical examination of humanistic psychology's contributions to date. While the fourteen chapters of this volume are not systematically linked to each other, they are all based on the common belief that a distinctly human psychology can develop only by taking into account "a historical perspective, a philosophy, an anthropology, a theoretical program, a methodology (and practical applications) arising from the content of experience.

Joseph R. Royce who is located at the Theoretical Psychology Center at the University of Alberta and Leendert P. Mos, of the same Institute, have attempted, through this book,

to bring disciplined enquiry from a variety of sources to bear on the task of situating human psychology in a more encompassing perspective than it has attained in the past. In my opinion, the essays in this volume do indeed meet the criterion of serious, disciplined enquiry. Helping professionals who wish either to advocate or criticize a humanistic psychology basis for "helping" will find most of the essays in this book of unusual value. In the following paragraphs I will briefly examine some of the concepts and criticisms presented by contributors to this work which I found especially compelling.

I found the initial chapter by Carl Graumann (Psychologisches Institut der Universität Heidelberg) to be a brief but incisive opening up of the historical and contemporary "streams" of humanistic thought and simultaneously presenting a perspective combining both European and North American contributions to a human psychology. Graumann takes a critical view toward both behavioristic and humanistic "movements" and argues that a "human" psychology must necessarily account not only for the characteristics of persons but at the same time, their situatedness. In his view, which is phenomenological-dialectical, he relies upon the Dutch psychologist Lischoten ("Psychology is the scientific study of the situated person") and Sartre ("Situation et motivation ne font qu'un.") to indicate that a human psychology can best be organized around *intentionality*. Intentionality means that any human activity (behavior, consciousness, experience) refers to *something* which, by this very activity, is meant (intended) to exist independently of its being intended.

The person is forever existing in ambiguity — being imprisoned in the situation or transcending the situation. This ambiguity is one of, *the* essential human conditions. This predicament of ambiguity must surely be familiar to every counsellor or therapist who remains aware of the living experience of others, and his or her own as well. By such arguments Graumann attempts to show if one has a "sincere concern for practical humanity" then what is needed is not a "third force" or human potential "movement", but rather a "conceptually restructured human psychology."

Coward and Royce, in their chapter entitled: "Toward an Epistemological Basis for Humanistic Psychology" pose a most interesting question: "How can we justify

knowledge claims in humanistic psychology?" Such a question rests on an assumed distinction between "humanistic" knowledge i.e., metaphoric, nondiscursive, symbolic knowing, in contrast to "scientific" knowledge i.e., literal, discursive knowing based on sign language.

Granted such a distinction, then how can humanistic knowledge claims be justified? Joyce argues that metaphors enable us to explicate those essential human experiences which are not conveyed well by literal, abstract, logical, sign language. Metaphors must always be interpreted within their context of occurrence. To use metaphors without regard to context as in logical argument is to generate serious misunderstandings. So how can the question of epistemological validity for metaphoric knowledge be ascertained? Coward and Royce make two suggestions: (1) by developing the properties of existential validity; and (2) by protecting the multiple meanings of the metaphor.

Existential validity implies first of all that the realities of human existence have to be "unmasked". The concern with authenticity in existential thinking and the attention given to meaning and values are central to existential validity as an epistemic norm. Enquiry into authenticity "unmasks" the superficial, the trivial, the prosaic. Authenticity demands an empathic-participative knowing which penetrates and intensifies. The knowledge gained through metaphoric thought is not logical determination but rather is distilling and intensification of meaning. What is known becomes known in ever-greater depth and intensity. Differences, which are emphasized in logical enquiry, are distilled into a focal whole — each part of the whole becomes experienced (known) as the whole itself. This is exactly what occurs in those rare moments of encounter when we come face-to-face with the other and have an authentic knowledge of the other in the moment of our being-together.

Discursive knowing directs one's attention from the thing itself to its structure and attributes. Metaphoric knowing brings on an intensive awareness of the thing itself. Such an immediate personal, participative response is one aspect of knowledge validation.

As for the multiple meanings of metaphors, a dialectical analysis can be applied to metaphoric knowing which confronts contradictions with the intent of revealing strengths and weakness of the knowledge, finding the

essential elements and discarding those that are found wanting. Such an analysis assumes that no final, *correct* interpretation of human meaning is possible; rather the best which can be done is to identify "plausible theses which best accomodate the available evidence for a given duration of time."

What is the main function of humanistic knowledge? Perhaps in that it teaches "us to see more subtly and profoundly".

Knowledge of the human person can be gained directly through critical reflection on one's own experience, or through empathic participation in the lives of others. Humanistic knowledge also comes from the drama, the poem, the story which although fictional, may none-the-less be authentic and penetrating. Existential validity and multiple meanings are epistemic criteria for claims that such knowledge is legitimate.

Other chapters of this book are equally provocative. The late Daniel Berlyne (University of Toronto) analyzes humanistic psychology as a "protest movement". Berlyne claims that most of the bases for humanistic psychology have little or no merit at all. Donald Kuiken (Department of Psychology, University of Alberta) details the need for the development of "experiential description" and then presents a "strategy for collecting and analyzing freely reported introspection in a wide variety of situations". This chapter should be of interest to researchers who are trying to educate themselves in subjective or hermeneutic methods of enquiry.

Who should read this book? In my opinion, those who are already committed to a humanistic approach in counselling or psychology will find a rigor which is often lacking in humanistic writing. Those who are opposed to humanistic approaches will find some very strong ammunition for their own viewpoints — they will also find some humanistically-oriented arguments and concepts which are not at all easily refuted. Any practitioner who wishes to strengthen the conceptual foundations of his or her own practical work will find plenty of material to consider. Finally, graduate students in counselling and psychology who wish to ask questions designed to embarrass their professors should find much inspiration in this book. Since the chapters are not logically linked to one another, the volume makes a nice bed-time reader — but not if your nocturnal needs are for light reading!